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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
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(D.V.I. No. 1-05-cv-00199) 
 
       Fluro Corporation; 
       Plant Performance Services LLC, 
           Appellants 
_______________________ 
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Division of St. Croix 
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(Honorable Legrome D. Davis) 
______________ 
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 Before:  SCIRICA, RENDELL and AMBRO, Circuit Judges. 
 
 (Filed: July 21, 2011) 
_________________ 
 
 OPINION OF THE COURT 
_________________ 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Appellants Plant Performance Services, LLC (“P2S”) and Fluor Corporation seek 
reversal of an order denying their request for a stay pending arbitration.  We will affirm. 
I. 
 Plaintiffs are a group of employees who applied to work for companies servicing 
the HOVENSA, LLC, refinery in St. Croix.  From June through October 2004, the 
plaintiffs worked for defendant Puerto Rican International Companies, Inc. (“PIC”) at the 
refinery.  Defendant P2S, a subsidiary of defendant Fluor Corporation, contracted to 
perform work at the HOVENSA refinery and subcontracted the work to PIC. 
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 Plaintiffs brought claims for discrimination under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et 
seq., and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 against PIC, P2S, Fluor, and HOVENSA.  P2S and Fluor 
sought to stay the suit under § 3 of the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 3, contending 
plaintiffs had agreed to arbitrate their claims.  However, defendants could only produce 
agreements with respect to eight of the forty-nine plaintiffs, and the remaining forty-one 
plaintiffs provided affidavits averring they had not agreed to arbitrate their claims.  The 
District Court denied the stay pending arbitration with respect to these forty-one 
plaintiffs.  P2S and Fluor appealed, and we affirmed the court’s order.  Mendez v. Puerto 
Rican Int’l Cos., Inc., 553 F.3d 709 (3d Cir. 2009). 
 On remand, P2S and Fluor moved to stay proceedings by eleven plaintiffs who 
had signed dispute resolution agreements (DRAs) with other companies.  In these DRAs 
plaintiffs agreed to arbitrate disputes arising from their application for or subsequent 
employment at the HOVENSA refinery by these other companies.1
                                                 
1 Originally, PS2 and Flour sought a stay with respect to fifteen plaintiffs, but withdrew 
their motion as to four plaintiffs who did not appear to have signed the agreements 
defendants produced. 
  These eleven 
plaintiffs signed the DRAs when applying for employment or working for Wyatt VI, Inc., 
or Triangle Construction & Maintenance, Inc., two other contractors on the HOVENSA 
refinery not named as defendants in this suit.  One of the plaintiffs, Carlos Garcia, signed 
a DRA in 2003 in connection with employment by Wyatt at the refinery, prior to working 
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for PIC.  The ten other plaintiffs’2
 The District Court denied defendants’ motion for a stay pending arbitration.  It did 
not reach the issue of whether P2S and Fluor were beneficiaries of the Wyatt and 
Triangle DRAs.  It found that the DRAs, which lacked explicit durational language, 
applied only to disputes arising during the actual employment transaction for which the 
plaintiffs signed the DRAs.  Accordingly, it found the period for which Garcia promised 
to arbitrate disputes terminated in 2003 when his employment with Wyatt terminated.  It 
found the remaining plaintiffs’ DRAs, not being in effect until 2005 or later, did not 
apply retroactively and therefore did not encompass their claims against P2S or Fluor for 
conduct in 2004. 
 agreements were signed on various dates ranging from 
2005 to 2008, all ten after their employment with PIC ended. 
II. 
 P2S and Fluor contend they were third-party beneficiaries of the plaintiffs’ DRAs 
with Wyatt or Triangle and that the court erred in denying their motion by limiting the 
temporal scope of these DRAs.3
                                                 
2 These plaintiffs are Marco Rijo, Keith Simon, Orson Flemming, Miguel Liriano, Cyril 
Thomas, Michael Bynoe, Alfred James, Heriberto Laboy, Sostenes Montilla, and 
Catherine Saban.   
  
3 We have jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal under § 16 of the FAA, 9 U.S.C. § 
16(a)(1)(A), which provides for review of the denial of a motion for a stay pending 
arbitration alleging a prima facie case of entitlement to arbitration.  Mendez, 553 F.3d at 
710.  Because this presents a legal question concerning the enforceability of an arbitration 
agreement, our standard of review is plenary.  Edwards v. Hovensa, LLC, 497 F.3d 355, 
362-63 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing Harris v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 183 F.3d 173, 176 (3d 
Cir.1999)). 
5 
 
 “[T]he central or ‘primary’ purpose of the FAA is to ensure that ‘private 
agreements to arbitrate are enforced according to their terms.’”  Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. 
AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., --- U.S. ----, 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1773 (2010) (quoting Volt Info. 
Sci., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989)).  “In 
this endeavor, ‘as with any other contract, the parties’ intentions control.’”  Id. (quoting 
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626 (1985)).   
 Both DRAs make clear the agreements were in anticipation of plaintiffs’ interview 
or subsequent employment with Wyatt or Triangle.  The Wyatt DRA states in the 
relevant portion: 
Regardless of whether Wyatt offers me employment, both Wyatt and I 
agree to resolve any and all claims, disputes, or controversies arising out of 
or relating to: (1) my application or candidacy for employment; (2) an 
alleged wrongful decision not to hire me; (3) any statutory claim for 
discrimination or harassment on the basis of age, sex, race, color, religion, 
disability, or national origin under by [sic] state, federal, or territorial law 
that are pursued outside the grievance and arbitration provisions of the 
CBA; and (4) any claim for personal injury or property damage arising in 
any way from my presence at the HOVENSA refinery that are not covered 
by the CBA; exclusively by final and binding arbitration . . . . 
 
The Triangle DRA states: 
I recognize that differences may arise between Triangle and me in relation 
to my application for employment or any possible subsequent employment.  
Both Triangle and I agree to resolve any and all claims, disputes, or 
controversies, arising out of or relating to my application or candidacy for 
employment, the terms and conditions of any offer of employment, the 
relationship between me and Triangle, any termination of my employment 
with Triangle, my presence at [t]he HOVENSA refinery, or any related 
matter, exclusively by final and binding arbitration . . . . 
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We agree with the District Court’s interpretation of the agreements.  While these 
agreements lack specific durational language, principles of contract interpretation and the 
agreement themselves support that plaintiffs did not agree to arbitrate the claims arising 
in 2004. 
 The DRAs do not apply to events prior to the plaintiffs applications for 
employment with Wyatt or Triangle.  “Words and other conduct are interpreted in the 
light of all the circumstances, and if the principal purpose of the parties is ascertainable it 
is given great weight.”  Restatement (Second) Contracts of § 202.  Arbitration 
agreements generally do not reach back to preexisting disputes without indication that 
such disputes are within the scope of the arbitration clause.  See, e.g., Peerless Imps. Inc. 
v. Wine, Liquor & Distillery Workers Union Local One, 903 F.2d 924, 928 (2d Cir. 
1990).  Both DRAs make clear the purpose of the agreement is to resolve disputes related 
to interviewing with or working for Triangle or Wyatt.  The Wyatt DRA prefaces the 
agreement with the statement “[r]egardless of whether Wyatt offers me employment.”  
The Triangle DRA expressly states it applies to ensuing, not preexisting, disagreements 
by limiting it to disputes “in relation to [plaintiff’s] application . . . or any possible 
subsequent employment.”  The references to presence at the HOVENSA refinery must be 
read in light of this purpose—employment at the non-defendant contractors.  The 
argument that plaintiffs and non-defendant contractors mutually assented to arbitrate 
preexisting disputes arising from prior employment with other contractors lacks support 
in both the text of the DRAs and the context of the transactions.  Accordingly, the court 
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correctly construed plaintiffs’ promises to arbitrate as coinciding with the plaintiffs’ 
transactions with Wyatt or Triangle. 
 Plaintiff Carlos Garcia similarly did not contract to arbitrate his disputes with P2S 
and Fluor even though he signed a DRA with Wyatt before 2004.  As noted, the Wyatt 
DRA was a promise to arbitrate claims arising from plaintiffs’ interview or employment 
with Wyatt.  When Garcia’s employment by Wyatt ended in 2003, the DRA and Garcia’s 
duty to arbitrate new claims arising from his presence at the refinery ceased.  See Litton 
Fin. Printing Div. a Div. of Litton Bus. Sys., Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 501 U.S. 190, 206 (1991) 
(“[A]n expired contract has by its own terms released all its parties from their respective 
contractual obligations, except obligations already fixed under the contract but as yet 
unsatisfied.”).  Accordingly, claims arising out of his presence at the HOVENSA refinery 
for employment with another company months later were not within the scope of the 
agreement. 
III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the court’s denial of defendants’ motion 
for a stay pending arbitration. 
